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COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS
What Does China Want From International Tax Reform?
by Wei Cui
The G-7 countries’ June 5 accord to implement 
a global minimum corporate tax rate promises to 
set off frenzied negotiations among nations 
regarding coordinated international tax reform. 
Finance ministers from the G-20 countries met in 
Venice on July 9-10, after this magazine went to 
press. Whether members of the G-7 club can 
persuade the larger group to endorse their 
minimum tax proposal will determine what 
mandate the OECD receives to continue the 
(re-)negotiations under pillars 1 and 2 of its 
program of work to develop a consensus solution. 
How will China respond to the G-7 proposal at the 
G-20 meeting? That question is especially
intriguing, given the growing political
antagonisms between China and some G-7
countries.1
This article offers some broad reflections on 
how well aligned China’s recent international tax 
policy choices are with the G-7’s minimum tax 
proposal. The reflections are based on analyses of 
Chinese tax law and policy, and not on recent 
pronouncements by Chinese political leaders, 
diplomats, or commentators. The aim is not to 
predict the positions the Chinese government will 
take at the meeting or during further OECD 
negotiations; instead, it is to identify several tax 
policy priorities that emerged in recent years for 
the Chinese government that may be affected by 
the G-7’s global minimum tax proposal. In 
particular, it argues that in several striking ways, 
China can be seen as facing policy choices similar 
to many the United States has confronted.
Recent speculations about China’s 
international tax policy have been made more 
often in connection with the OECD’s pillar 1 
proposals, such as whether China may desire to 
protect its technological titans from digital 
services taxes or welcome greater profit allocation 
to market jurisdictions. As pillar 2 ideas drive 
proposed international negotiations and the scope 
of pillar 1 shrinks, the questions facing China (and 
many other countries) are different. Arguably, the 
global minimum tax proposal is more important 
for China than even the OECD’s earlier pillar 1 
blueprint, let alone any “pillar 1 light” that may 
emerge in the coming months.2
The shifting emphasis of political discussions 
from pillar 1 to pillar 2 calls for one additional 
preliminary remark. It should be obvious that the 
position China (or any country, for that matter) 
takes toward OECD negotiations will depend on 
what the negotiations are about, including 
whether they have any substance. The G-7’s recent 
announcement, reflecting the new U.S. policy 
agenda under the Biden administration, is touted 
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1
James T. Areddy, “The G-7’s Global Tax Deal Faces a China Test,” The 
Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2021; and Karla Adam et al., “G-7 Takes 
Stronger Stand Against China, at U.S. Urging,” The Washington Post, June 
13, 2021.
2
For a provocative proposal to give pillar 1 more substance, see 
Mitchell Kane and Adam Kern, “Progressive Formulary Apportionment: 
The Case for ‘Amount D,’” Tax Notes Int’l, June 14, 2021, p. 1483.
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first and foremost as about strengthening the 
corporate income tax throughout the world and 
ending the “race to the bottom” of tax 
competition. Yet just less than half a year ago, the 
OECD stated that the main purpose of 
international tax cooperation was to end the 
undesirable proliferation of unilateral taxes — a 
race to the top in which small, open economies 
hasten to impose taxes on foreign multinationals.3 
That gives the impression that countries favor 
coordination on international tax matters to such 
an extent that any kind of race, either up or down, 
is too disorderly.4
Of course, the apparent versatility of 
international cooperation has also led many to 
suggest that other than complexity, very little will 
change. But if very little of substance changes, it is 
also humdrum to predict what China (or any 
other country) will do in a sheer game of 
diplomacy (and bargaining for bargaining’s sake). 
Therefore, this article considers how China might 
respond to more substantive versions of global 
minimum tax proposals, whether or not those 
versions will eventually be agreed to or are even 
under serious discussion.
China and the United States are remarkably 
similar in their aversion to using consumption 
and personal income tax (PIT) instruments to 
raise revenue and their preference for the 
corporate income tax (CIT). Both also drifted 
away from a paradigm of taxing the foreign 
income of multinationals that the United States 
first adopted in the 1960s. While the United States 
did so over the course of four decades, China did 
so in just one. The extent to which each is willing 
or able to halt that drift is what is at stake in the 
current global minimum tax debate. Taking 
another page from a book familiar to U.S. 
policymakers, China offers many incentives to 
engage in rate-reducing tax competition to attract 
foreign investment and promote (quasi-)domestic 
financial centers, including Hong Kong. The 
meaning of multilateralism in international tax 
cooperation, however, differs for the two 
countries.
I. The CIT as a Stalwart Revenue Source
The figure offers an overview of the evolution 
of China’s tax structure since the late 1990s. The 
CIT’s share of total tax revenue (inclusive of social 
insurance contributions) generally rose after 1999 
and remained steady after 2008, when the 
Enterprise Income Tax Law (EITL) unified 
previously separate CIT regimes for domestic- 
and foreign-owned companies. The CIT’s share of 
total revenue has held up despite substantial rate 
cuts during the past decade, the largest of which 
were delivered through nominally temporary, but 
repeatedly renewed, extra-statutory expansions 
of a preferential regime for small- and micro-
profit enterprises (SMPEs).5 Although the EITL 
prescribed a 20 percent rate for SMPEs, beginning 
in 2009 the Ministry of Finance and State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT) introduced a 
series of policies to reduce the rate to 10 percent 
for companies under specific asset, employee, and 
taxable income thresholds. By 2019 all companies 
with less than CNY 50 million (approximately 
$7.7 million) in assets, fewer than 300 employees, 
and taxable income of less than CNY 1 million 
enjoyed a 5 percent CIT rate, while those that 
made between CNY 1 million and CNY 3 million 
in taxable income had a 10 percent rate.
Because, as in other countries, a large portion 
of Chinese corporations are loss making in the 
first place, the Chinese government announced in 
2019 that the SMPE tax preference extended to 
over 95 percent of all Chinese businesses, making 
it an “inclusive” tax cut. For CIT liabilities to be 
reduced for such a large population of companies 
and for CIT revenue to increase at the same time, 
some Chinese companies must have become very 
profitable.
3
OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From Digitalisation — Economic 
Impact Assessment,” at 11 (Nov. 2020) (“The absence of a consensus-
based solution would likely lead to a proliferation of uncoordinated and 
unilateral tax measures (for example, digital services taxes) and an 
increase in damaging tax and trade disputes. . . . In the ‘worst-case’ 
scenario, these disputes could reduce global GDP by more than 1 
percent.”).
4
That is among several unusual features of the recent discourse on 
international tax coordination discussed in a working paper. See Wei Cui, 
“New Puzzles in International Tax Coordination,” SSRN Working Paper 
(2021).
5
That expansion of the SMPE regime is documented in Cui, The 
Administrative Foundations of the Chinese Fiscal State, at ch. 7 (forthcoming 
2021).
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The figure also shows that in contrast to the 
CIT, the share of taxes on goods and services in 
China has declined substantially over the last 20 
years. The share of the PIT has also remained 
stagnant, at only around one-third of the CIT’s 
share.
There are many reasons to expect those trends 
to continue. For taxes on goods and services, the 
main reason has to do with a reform China 
implemented between 2012 and 2016 to combine 
VAT and a turnover tax on services called the 
business tax. The botched reform retained or 
introduced many turnover tax features under 
China’s VAT; its resulting inefficiencies (not its 
impact on consumer prices) generated strong 
political pressure to reduce VAT rates. Thus, 
unexpectedly for reform that was supposed to 
enhance the efficiency of the indirect tax system, 
the highest VAT rate was cut from 17 percent in 
2016 to 13 percent in 2019.
Increases in VAT rates seem unlikely in the 
near future. Likewise, the Chinese government 
has chosen to pander to the urban affluent class by 
repeatedly cutting the PIT. Public opinion is easily 
mobilized against PIT increases, and given the 
tax’s low revenue share, it is also unlikely that the 
government will raise it to generate revenue in the 
next few years.
6
The only major source of tax revenue that has 
shown substantial gain in revenue share is social 
insurance contributions. However, those 
contributions (by both employers and employees) 
significantly increase labor costs, especially for 
micro, small, and midsize firms. Pressures to 
reduce companies’ social insurance contributions 
are therefore also intense — and, unlike the VAT 
and PIT, perhaps justifiably so. It is notable, 
therefore, that China’s largest fiscal policy 
response to COVID-19 in 2020 consisted of 
temporary suspensions of major social insurance 
contributions for the vast majority of companies.7
6
For more on the government’s decision to shrink the PIT base in 
China and the botched VAT reform, see id. at ch. 6.
7
See Cui, Jeff Hicks, and Max Norton, “How Well-Targeted Are 
Payroll Tax Cuts as a Response to COVID-19: Evidence From China,” 
SSRN Working Paper (2020).
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Overall, it seems reasonable to project that 
Chinese policymakers are more likely to cut VAT 
and social insurance rates in the coming years 
than they are to raise them. And with CIT revenue 
staying healthy despite recent tax cuts, the 
government can be predicted to continue to rely 
on the CIT.
There is a surprising affinity between China’s 
current tax structure and recent U.S. tax policy 
choices. In contrast to the United States and other 
developed countries, China raises relatively little 
revenue from the PIT. The CIT thus serves as an 
important substitute for taxing capital income 
earned by individuals — that is, shareholders.
However, increasingly, China’s reliance on 
that substitute cannot be explained by the lack of 
government capacity to collect the PIT (a factor 
commonly used to explain low PIT revenue in 
developing countries). In the early 2000s, China’s 
PIT revenue saw rapid growth as a result of rising 
incomes. For the CIT to retain its dominance in 
Chinese income taxation, the Chinese 
government had to take a series of political 
decisions to keep PIT revenue from rising. In 
particular, it kept the individual taxation of 
capital income low and reduced the PIT liabilities 
of all but the top 10 percent of urban wage earners.
The general rationale behind those decisions 
seems to be that strongly progressive tax 
schedules should be applied only to the very top 
(for example, 1 percent) of the income 
distribution. That echoes the Biden 
administration’s policy not to increase taxes on 
Americans with annual income of less than 
$400,000.
Similarly, China has the capacity to raise more 
revenue through the VAT but, especially in the 
last five years, has increasingly turned away from 
the VAT as a revenue source. Although that is 
mainly because of business criticisms of a poorly 
designed system, it is still notable because a well-
designed VAT is regarded as a more efficient tax 
than the traditional CIT.
The United States has also spurned a VAT, 
even as Democrats aim to substantially and 
permanently increase public spending. The 
decision to embrace the CIT instead of more 
efficient taxation of personal consumption and 
shareholder-level taxation thus marks a point of 
commonality among the world’s two largest 
economies.
II. Retreating From Worldwide Taxation
A simple, if perhaps naïve, view of the gist of 
the G-7’s global minimum tax proposals is that 
capital exporting countries would strengthen 
residence-country corporate taxation of the 
foreign income of their “own” multinationals. 
Instead of acquiescing to the use of tax havens to 
achieve either deferral or permanent exemption 
from residence-country taxation, foreign income 
earned in or shifted to low-tax jurisdictions would 
be subject to a residence-country minimum tax on 
a current basis.8
The first thing to note about that policy 
objective is that China is one of the few leading 
economies that still operate (nominally) a U.S.-
style worldwide tax system in corporate taxation. 
In fact, China embraced that kind of system just as 
other major economies began to abandon it. The 
EITL (adopted in March 2007) introduced a slew 
of new rules to strengthen residence-based 
taxation, including rules on controlled foreign 
corporations and a management and control 
criterion for corporate residence (in addition to 
the place of incorporation criterion).9 Those rules 
were not adopted based on existing Chinese 
practice or revenue needs, but simply borrowed 
from what had appeared to be a normative 
paradigm of international taxation.10 Yet in 2009, 
when the United Kingdom and Japan switched to 
the exemption treatment of foreign business 
income, Beijing immediately felt doubt: Had 
China borrowed the wrong model?
The legislative timing of the EITL was ironic in 
another way. In 2006, when the law was drafted, 
China’s capital control regime still required all 
Chinese companies to repatriate foreign earnings 
immediately. The rapid buildup of China’s foreign 
currency reserve after the country’s accession to 
the WTO had still been so recent that its impact on 
China’s commercial and capital control policies 
8
In the OECD’s pillar 2 blueprint, that objective is reflected in the 
priority of the income inclusion rule over the undertaxed payment rule.
9
For an early overview of the EITL, see Fuli Cao, Corporate Income Tax 
Law and Practice in the People’s Republic of China (2011). A more recent 
overview can be found in Jinyan Li, International Taxation in China: A 
Contextualized Analysis (2016).
10
Two pre-2007 practices — per-country limitations on foreign tax 
credits and the denial of deductions of foreign losses against domestic 
income — were continued by the EITL. See Cui, “Designing Foreign Tax 
Credit Rules in China: The Case of Foreign Loss Limitations,” 38(5) Tax 
Mgmt. Int’l J. 277 (2009).
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could not be fully anticipated. Tax specialists even 
wondered which companies could have illegally 
kept income overseas so that the CFC rules would 
have applied. But just as the EITL was enacted, 
China’s trade and capital control regimes 
underwent major transformations. Outflows of 
capital were substantially liberalized — and, in 
fact, became necessary — because China 
continued to run large trade surpluses.
For many international tax advisers, that 
promised a golden age of serving Chinese clients 
“going out” by helping them navigate the EITL 
antiabuse rules. The Chinese government upped 
the ante in the advertising race among tax 
advisers by coining the phrase “One Belt, One 
Road” in 2013. However, for the last 10 years, 
advisers have struggled to articulate what 
outbound tax rules their clients should really care 
about. The problem is that like tax advisers 
elsewhere in the world, those in China 
erroneously assumed that international tax policy 
and trade policies are independent from each 
other.
In reality, of course, those policies are not 
independent. The United States’ much-admired 
subpart F rules, for example, were enacted while 
the country struggled to address a balance of 
payment crisis and explored all measures to bring 
capital back. Although curbing the use of tax 
havens may sound like the right thing to do in any 
circumstance, President Kennedy acknowledged 
that the real policy motive was that the United 
States could “no longer afford existing tax 
treatment of foreign income . . . if we are to 
emphasize investment in this country in order to 
stimulate our economy and our plant 
modernization, as well as ease our balance of 
payments deficit.”11 As the crisis worsened, the 
United States temporarily adopted capital control 
and an embargo on net direct investment 
outflows to continental Europe.12
If the U.S. introduction of subpart F rules can 
be seen as a precursor to more stringent capital 
control policies before the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed, China’s 2007 introduction of anti-
deferral rules and other measures for 
strengthened residence-country taxation can be 
viewed, conversely, as vulnerable from the start to 
China’s becoming a major capital exporter and the 
consequent reversals of Chinese capital control 
and commercial policies. Essentially, many of the 
EITL’s provisions applicable to Chinese 
companies’ foreign activities immediately went 
into a mode of indefinite nonenforcement.
That is most obvious in the application of the 
management and control criterion of corporate 
residence. Most of the Chinese companies listed 
on the U.S. and Hong Kong stock exchanges — 
ranging from Alibaba and Tencent today to tech 
favorites of the past such as Sina, Sohu, Baidu, 
NetEase, and Ctrip — are incorporated overseas 
but managed and controlled in China. Indeed, 
even the companies’ shareholder meetings are 
generally convened in China. Yet few, if any, have 
been deemed by Chinese tax authorities to have 
Chinese tax residence.13 Although those 
“roundtripping” corporate structures — with 
layers of holding companies inserted between 
operating companies in China and Chinese 
shareholders — historically served to exploit 
regulatory loopholes and tax preferences offered 
to foreign investors, nowadays they also offer a 
generally available and widely used form of de 
facto corporate inversion that reduces residence-
based taxation of foreign income.
The uses of that tax structure have also been 
unimpeded by Chinese CFC rules (which would 
be applicable to domestic shareholders). There 
have been few reports of the enforcement of CFC 
11
President John F. Kennedy’s Special Message to the Congress on 
Taxation (Apr. 20, 1961). The same policy objective of discouraging 
capital exports led to the adoption of the interest equalization tax to 
make it less profitable for U.S. investors to purchase foreign securities; 
see the Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963 (H.R. 8000).
12
Atish R. Ghosh and Mahvash S. Qureshi, “What’s in a Name? That 
Which We Call Capital Controls,” IMF Working Paper WP/16/25, at 18-
19 (2016).
13
In 2009 the SAT adopted a rule that in effect permitted corporate 
taxpayers to elect Chinese tax resident status. SAT, “Notice Regarding 
the Treatment of Chinese-Controlled, Foreign-Registered Enterprises as 
Resident Enterprises Under the ‘Body of Substantive Management’ 
Test,” Guoshuifa [2009] 82 (Apr. 22, 2009). Some taxpayers that repatriate 
dividends to China have made that election to take advantage of the 
intercorporate dividend exemption, but there is no incentive to make it if 
deferral is the objective. For discussion of that rule as a measure to 
facilitate state-owned companies’ tax planning, see Cui, “Taxation of 
State-Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence From China,” 
in Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State 
Capitalism 122-124 (2015).
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rules in China,14 even though the continued use of 
offshore structures by listed companies and the 
extent of foreign earnings are regularly disclosed 
in their financial statements. Meanwhile, there is 
empirical evidence of rapidly growing uses of tax 
haven subsidiaries by companies headquartered 
in China, public or private.15
Further signs of the Chinese government’s 
intent to lower taxation of the foreign income of 
Chinese companies emerged in the application of 
foreign tax credit rules. In 2011 the MOF and SAT 
granted permission to China’s state-owned 
petroleum companies to elect out of the per-
country FTC limitation. The only condition on 
that election is that taxpayers must adhere to it for 
five years. The agencies also relaxed indirect FTC 
rules so that foreign taxes paid by subsidiaries 
indirectly owned by Chinese taxpayers through 
up to five tiers of indirect shareholding can give 
rise to FTCs when dividends are repatriated. 
Under prior policies, indirect FTCs would not be 
available for earnings below the third-tier 
subsidiary.16 In 2017 the MOF and SAT released 
rules that gave all taxpayers access to similar FTC 
benefits.17
If that trickle of increasingly favorable 
treatment of outbound investment seems too 
obscure and to offer only indirect evidence of the 
Chinese government’s gradual abandonment of 
worldwide taxation, developments in 2020 help to 
dispel doubt. On June 1 none other than the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party itself released — jointly with the State 
Council — a 15-year grand plan for establishing a 
Hainan free trade port. The plan envisions that 
the province of Hainan will become a trade, 
investment, and finance hub comparable to 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Dubai — but much 
larger. Not surprisingly, the Hainan port would be 
supported by a plethora of tax preferences. The 
Central Committee and State Council announced 
that the corporate tax rate for companies 
established in the Hainan free trade port and in 
favored industries would be reduced to 15 
percent.18
More importantly, the plan contemplates 
complete CIT exemption for foreign income 
earned by Hainan companies in favored 
industries — namely, tourism, modern services, 
and high and new technology industries. 
Although the exemption is supposed to last only 
until 2025, given the long-term horizon of the 
Hainan undertaking and the Chinese 
government’s record of repeatedly extending CIT 
preferences,19 it would be surprising if the 
exemption was not renewed. According to MOF 
and SAT guidance, for the exemption to apply, the 
minimum statutory — not effective — tax rate of 
the foreign jurisdiction where the income arises 
must be 5 percent.20
Overall, therefore, China’s retreat from the 
rigorous residence-based taxation initially 
announced in the EITL has been unidirectional 
and suggests that China’s choice of the worldwide 
taxation approach in 2007 was inadvertent. If the 
EITL had been submitted to the legislature for 
vote a few years later, the drafters may well have 
chosen to copy the exemption system instead. 
After all, if there is ever any fear that too much 
capital would leave China for tax reasons (despite 
low effective CIT rates), the Chinese government 
could simply use the levers of capital control to 
reduce that outflow.
Of course, China’s retreat from the worldwide 
toward the territorial system in corporate taxation 
represents a convergence with the world’s 
advanced economies. Like many other countries, 
China may have simply found it irresistible to 
subsidize the business expansion abroad of 
national champions. That would also be 
consistent with evidence that Chinese companies’ 
foreign activities increasingly resemble the 
activities of companies from advanced 
economies. A recent study showed that in 
14
The rare reported cases of enforcement present exceptions that 
prove the rule. See, e.g., Jinji Wei, “Increasing Chinese Tax Risk for CFCs’ 
Undistributed Profits,” Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 21, 2017, p. 754.
15
Katarzyna Bilicka, Yaxuan Qi, and Jing Xing, “Geographical 
Diversification of Tax Havens: How Did the Use of Tax Haven 
Subsidiaries Change in Recent Years?” Working Paper (2020).
16
See Cui, supra note 13, at 124.
17
MOF and SAT, “Notice Regarding Improving Tax Credit Policies 
for Enterprise Foreign Income,” Caishui [2017] 84 (Dec. 28, 2017).
18
One may expect that to be only the headline rate, given that, as 
discussed in Section I, supra, lower CIT rates of 5 percent and 10 percent 
have been applied to China’s most profitable SMPEs.
19
For example, the SMPE temporary tax reduction had been 
extended for over a decade.
20
MOF and SAT, “Notice Regarding Preference Enterprise Income 
Tax Policies for the Hainan FTP,” Caishui [2020] 31 (June 23, 2020).
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mergers and acquisitions, Chinese companies 
behave similarly to non-Chinese companies in 
many respects.21 An IMF study suggests that other 
than having a greater propensity to lend to 
emerging markets and developing economies, 
Chinese financial institutions engaged in 
outbound lending behave similarly to financial 
institutions from advanced economies.22 Both 
studies offer evidence that the impact of the Belt 
and Road Initiative is limited, implying that 
standard market considerations often drive 
outbound investments.
There are even plenty of parallels between 
China’s outbound tax policies and past U.S. policy 
choices. After abandoning the Bretton Woods 
system, the United States took important steps to 
enhance the competitiveness of U.S. businesses 
abroad. Although the attempt to emulate the 
European exemption system through a series of 
income tax regimes favoring exports was 
unsuccessful and found to be inconsistent with 
WTO rules,23 other measures, such as the cost-
sharing and check-the-box regulations, delivered 
similar benefits. In fact, because much 
multinational activity today involves trade in 
services — for example, pharmaceutical 
inventions and digital services — countries have 
relatively free rein to subsidize service exports, 
given the limited coverage of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services.
The first critical question, therefore, is 
whether the G-7’s call for strengthened residence-
based taxation is a call to end the long-running 
competition (especially among advanced 
economies) of export subsidies through the 
income tax system. That is clearly different from 
the way both G-7 lawmakers and the press have 
characterized the global race to the bottom — 
which is as one among countries trying to attract 
capital inflows (either as destinations or as 
conduits of capital flows). Another important 
question is whether any consensus includes 
commitments to adopt minimum tax rules or 
merely a commitment not to object to other 
countries’ adoption of those rules.
III. Making Doing Business in China Compelling
During the first few years after the EITL took 
effect in 2008, China’s SAT issued several informal 
policy directives to crack down on tax avoidance 
by foreign companies. One policy announced in 
200924 introduced criteria for beneficial ownership 
(required for claiming treaty benefits) that were 
much stronger than the watered-down beneficial 
ownership notion then expounded by the OECD 
model convention commentaries. Another policy 
introduced that year applied the EITL general 
antiavoidance rule to disregard offshore entities 
and tax capital gains realized on indirect sales or 
transfers of the shares of Chinese companies.25 The 
SAT also made a statement of policy through the 
U.N. Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for 
Developing Countries, claiming that 
considerations of “location saving advantages” 
required the allocation of more multinational 
profits to China as a producer jurisdiction.26
All those policies were declared well before 
the OECD launched its base erosion and profit-
shifting project. Although China is not an OECD 
member, the SAT’s antiabuse policies made China 
a perhaps welcome observer to the work of the 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs during the 
project. But China’s input into whatever 
negotiations went on in the original BEPS project 
was likely limited. It may be hard to remember, 
but because the OECD’s inclusive framework was 
not formed until 2016 — a fact routinely written 
out of narratives about international tax 
cooperation — the adoption of unilateral policy 
21
Clemens Fuest et al., “What Drives Chinese Overseas M&A 
Investment? Evidence From Micro Data,” 3 EconPol Working Paper 
33/2019 (Nov. 2019).
22
Eugenio Cerutti, Catherine Koch, and Pradhan Swapan-Kumar, 
“Banking Across Borders: Are Chinese Banks Different?” IMF Working 
Paper WP/20/249 (2020).
23
David L. Brumbaugh, “A History of the Extraterritorial Income 
(ETI) and Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Export Tax-Benefit 
Controversy,” Congressional Research Service (2004).
24
SAT, “Notice on the Understanding and Determination of 
‘Beneficial Owner’ in Tax Agreements,” Guoshuihan [2009] 601 (Nov. 5, 
2009). For discussion, see Li, supra note 9, at section 5.12.
25
SAT, “Notice on Strengthening the Management of Enterprise 
Income Tax Collection on Proceeds From Equity Transfers by Non-
Resident Enterprises,” Guoshuihan [2009] 698 (Dec. 10, 2009). See Cui, 
“Taxing Indirect Transfers: Improving an Instrument for Stemming Tax 
and Legal Base Erosion,” 33 Va. Tax Rev. 653 (2014).
26
See Sébastien Gonnet, “Location Specific Advantages — China,” 
10/11 Transfer Pricing Int’l J. 261 (Oct. 2011); Richard T. Ainsworth and 
Andrew Shact, “Transfer Pricing: UN Practical Manual — China,” 
Boston Univ. School of Law Public Law Research Paper No. 14-1 (2014); 
and Kane, “Location Savings and Segmented Factor Input Markets: In 
Search of a Tax Treaty Solution,” 41 Brook. J. Int’l L. (2016).
The extent to which Chinese tax authorities actually implemented 
the SAT’s conceptual declaration is less clear.
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initiatives by various countries was regarded as a 
faux pas at best, and certainly not worthy of trade 
wars or arduous efforts at international 
consensus.
When China hosted the G-20 meeting in 
Hangzhou in September 2016, the SAT’s antiabuse 
credentials in international taxation provided 
China’s political leaders with ready talking points. 
But in reality, after 2013, the SAT’s antiabuse 
initiatives against nonresidents came to be seen as 
inconsistent with larger policy initiatives — much 
as the EITL antiabuse measures for taxing 
residents’ foreign income succumbed to the 
reversal of China’s capital control policy. First and 
foremost, Premier Li Keqiang launched a forceful 
campaign to improve China’s business 
environment that resulted in the country’s 
spectacular rise in the World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” rankings from 91st place in 2013 to 31st 
place in 2020. Most of the measures under that 
campaign involved reducing red tape and 
eliminating government approval requirements.
That has had a notable impact on the way 
Chinese tax authorities handle foreign investors. 
For example, the SAT announced new procedures 
for claiming treaty benefits in 2015, according to 
which supporting documents had to be filed only 
with the payer or withholding agent — not local 
tax authorities — for approval.27 In 2019 the 
enforcement of beneficial ownership rules was 
further relaxed when the SAT ushered in a 
remarkable, pre-FATCA U.S.-style regime for 
claiming treaty benefits: Eligibility became 
completely self-assessed, without a requirement 
to submit supporting documents — even with the 
withholding agent.28
Aggressive enforcement against foreign 
investors may also have come to be viewed as 
politically incorrect. The SAT proposed 
strengthened antiabuse measures on cross-border 
transactions in September 2015,29 only to drop 
them after encountering broad objections in 
public comments. That happened just as the 
OECD was beginning to market its finalized BEPS 
actions, but that auspicious timing was 
apparently not enough for the SAT to go against 
the new, pro-foreign-investor policy direction 
chosen by China’s political leaders. As readers of 
Tax Notes International may have realized, China 
has recently been the source of far fewer reports 
of, for example, guerilla warfare launched by 
Chinese local tax authorities against foreign 
indirect transfers, government transfer pricing 
victories, and treaty benefit denials. Instead, tax 
cuts have become perhaps the most important 
theme in tax news from China.
Some tax practitioners suggest that China’s 
recent turnaround in its approach to taxing 
nonresidents is attributable to tax competition 
and reflects a strong reaction to U.S. enactment of 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017.30 The narrative 
that China is engaged in tax competition with the 
United States certainly has some currency in 
Chinese business (and even policy) circles, but it 
seems unlikely to stand up to scrutiny. For one, 
even after the enactment of the TCJA, China’s 
headline corporate tax rate of 25 percent is still 
lower than the combined federal and state 
corporate tax rates in most U.S. states. And 
Chinese local governments engage in plenty of 
domestic tax competition to drive down effective 
corporate tax rates even further.31 Moreover, even 
though the TCJA lowered U.S. corporate rates, the 
base erosion and antiabuse tax increased the tax 
burden on foreign investors. That should have 
eased — not increased — competitive pressure to 
attract foreign investment.
In any case, both the size of China’s economy 
and its still-operative capital control system make 
it unlikely that the country would compete for 
capital through tax policy. Instead, tax policy is 
better seen as being merely complementary to a 
government’s general policy regarding further 
attracting foreign direct investment. In the past 
decade, China has displayed greater willingness 
to grant market access to foreign investors. That is 
motivated in part by the desire to ease trade 
27
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tension, in part by the hope to obtain reciprocal 
market access in foreign markets, and in part 
simply by the lowered need for protectionist 
policies.32 Because China is clearly no longer 
interested in just remaining the world’s factory 
floor and is on its way to becoming a leading 
nation in technology, finance, and other tradable 
services, allowing greater market access to 
foreigners may be a logical choice. Offering tax 
incentives — especially regional tax incentives 
that are already used as a result of purely 
domestic tax competition — is not a hard decision. 
After all, like most other large economies, China 
does not depend on taxing foreigners for revenue.
Two considerations regarding China’s 
preferential regimes for foreigners deserve special 
comment. They apply both to purely domestic 
regional preferential regimes (such as the Hainan 
free trade port and several other free trade zones 
in China) and, more prominently, to Hong Kong.
First, low-tax jurisdictions like Hong Kong 
play an important role even just for China’s own 
tax system. Hong Kong allows China to impose a 
lower tax on mobile capital, and even on some 
mobile labor, and thereby mitigates the pressure 
to lower taxes more generally for all labor and 
capital in the country. When Chinese bankers and 
fund managers can effectively operate from Hong 
Kong instead of Shanghai or Beijing, China faces 
less need to create preferential PIT regimes in the 
latter cities — and therefore less need to lower tax 
rates in the country as a whole. Similarly, in 
liberally allowing holding companies to be set up 
in Hong Kong and tolerating the Chinese version 
of corporate inversions, China simultaneously 
gives its companies access to foreign portfolio 
capital and segregates the taxation of domestic 
and international portfolio capital. Thus, even 
though Hong Kong’s tax system and fiscal policies 
are different from China’s, the Chinese 
government should be thought of as invested in 
Hong Kong’s low-tax system.
There is much evidence consistent with that 
view. For instance, although China strengthened 
beneficial ownership rules in 2009, it relaxed the 
rules in a somewhat secret fashion for Hong Kong 
in 2013.33 Treaty shopping is at least a lesser sin, 
and perhaps even a desired outcome, when the 
treaty is with Hong Kong.
Second, Hong Kong’s status as a leading 
global financial center is important for China’s 
global economic strategies. Although China may 
well aspire to host a greater number of global 
financial hubs — whether in Hainan, Shanghai, or 
elsewhere — low taxation of financial capital is 
likely to remain an essential component of policy 
packages to nurture those hubs. Thus, any global 
minimum tax proposal that threatens to shut 
down tax incentives for creating financial hubs 
should hold China’s attention.
Many salient aspects of U.S. tax policy on 
inbound investment are meant to lure financial 
capital through low taxes — including, for 
example, the tax exemptions for foreign deposit 
interest and portfolio interest, as well as the 
securities trading safe harbor from net basis 
taxation of U.S. trade or business.34 Not only did 
those policies break then-prevailing international 
tax principles when enacted,35 but they also 
remain some of the most distinct features of the 
U.S. tax regime for foreign investors.36 More 
broadly, it is also relevant that even under the 
most ambitious international financial agreement 
that the world has known — the Bretton Woods 
system for maintaining currency exchange 
stability — the two major sponsors of the system, 
the United States and the United Kingdom, 
refrained from international cooperation to 
promote their own financial institutions and 
centers. The Bank of England and the U.S. 
Treasury tolerated the emergence of a Eurodollar 
market to keep London as an international 
financial center, and the United States declined to 
cooperate in enforcing other countries’ outflow 
restrictions.37 That suggests that insofar as new 
international tax agreements may encroach on the 
32
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development of new financial centers, China (and 
other countries sponsoring those kinds of centers) 
should be wary.
IV. Multilateralism: Why Not?
Summarizing the discussion so far, the main 
components of China’s tax policy that may have a 
bearing on the G-7’s global minimum tax platform 
appear to be the following: China relies on the CIT 
for revenue more than does the United States, and 
its CIT revenue has been strong despite recent 
substantial tax cuts for small companies and a 
proliferation of local preferential regimes. 
Although the foreign activities and profits of 
Chinese multinationals have likely risen in 
absolute terms in the past decade, it is unknown 
how much the share of foreign profits in the same 
companies’ total profits has risen.
In any case, there is no sign that China, in the 
absence of new international agreements, wants 
to tax its multinationals’ foreign profits more to 
raise additional revenue. Instead, it has taken 
notable measures to reduce that taxation by 
continuing to tolerate its version of corporate 
inversions, relaxing FTC rules, unevenly 
enforcing CFC rules, and experimenting with 
territorial taxation. It had many examples to 
follow in policies adopted by advanced 
economies such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan.
China also presents itself as more open to 
foreign investment than ever. Without any clear 
threat of external tax competition, the SAT has 
toned down the antiabuse policies and 
pronouncements against nonresident taxpayers it 
issued just after the EITL’s enactment. Preferential 
income tax measures are now regularly offered in 
policy packages supporting domestic trade and 
investment hubs. Hong Kong as a low-tax 
jurisdiction and global financial center adjacent to 
mainland China is also playing an ever-more-
entrenched role in China’s own tax system. Before 
and unless it is replaced by some purely domestic 
jurisdiction that serves as a hub of global financial 
capital, Hong Kong will likely remain vital to 
China’s global economic strategy.
What does all that imply for China’s response 
to the G-7’s global minimum tax proposal? As 
stated, the answer depends on what is in that 
proposal — and the proposal’s substance will also 
determine the forms of international cooperation 
China may be expected to participate in. 
Consider, for instance, a simplified 
characterization of the global minimum tax 
proposal based on the OECD’s pillar 2 blueprint: 
An income inclusion rule (IIR) and an undertaxed 
payment rule (UTPR) will be used to ensure that 
multinationals bear a minimum effective tax rate 
on their profits. Two questions can be raised about 
how those two rules will work. The first is 
whether they will be made mandatory in an 
international consensus — that is, whether they 
are minimal standards to be adopted by all 
participants in an international agreement.38 The 
second is how strong the rules will be and 
whether there will be extensive carveouts. Those 
questions are related because mandatory 
requirements on a large group of countries will 
also likely be much weaker in substance.
Suppose the minimum tax proposal does not 
impose any strict requirement that countries enact 
the IIR or UPTR. Instead, countries would simply 
agree that the imposition of those rules is 
permitted, even if some may otherwise view them 
as violating “prevailing international tax policy 
principles.”39 That leaves some countries to form a 
“coalition of the willing” to impose the rules.40 
And the expectation of some of those countries — 
at least the United States — is that countries not 
part of the coalition will be encouraged to adopt 
the IIR or UTPR because they stand only to gain 
from adopting, given the adoption by the initial 
coalition countries.
Should China be expected to join the initial 
coalition of the willing? It seems the answer 
should be no. Consider first the IIR: Rigorous 
worldwide taxation of corporate income (of the 
kind the United States introduced during the 
Bretton Woods era) is a well-known approach to 
international taxation, and its adoption by many 
countries has long represented a loose coalition of 
38
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the willing. Early adoptions of that approach were 
uncoordinated, and there is little evidence that 
countries like the United Kingdom and Japan 
began to defect only because they could not bind 
other countries to adopt (there seems to be no 
evidence of any attempt to bind others).
China also wrote the principles of worldwide 
taxation of corporate income into its legislation, 
but from the start was not prepared to enforce 
them. That suggests that the benefits of rigorous 
worldwide corporate taxation for China were 
unclear, regardless of the strategic decisions of 
other countries. Because countries that do not join 
the initial coalition in adopting the IIR have the 
option of adopting it later — in fact, the United 
States predicts that other countries will adopt 
those rules once the UTPR is in place in enough 
countries — it seems that a better strategy is to 
wait to decide on adoption. (That argument, of 
course, applies to most countries, not just China.)
By the same token, China should not want to 
join the initial coalition to adopt the UTPR either. 
Any country may adopt the UTPR either to force 
other countries to adopt the IIR or to simply raise 
revenue (while leveling the playing field for 
multinationals). If China is unlikely to join the 
initial IIR coalition, it seems unlikely that it would 
be interested in forcing other countries to adopt 
the rule. Moreover, judging by its policy choices in 
the last decade, China does not appear to be 
keenly interested in raising more revenue from 
foreigners or removing any tax advantage for 
other countries’ multinationals.
In short, if the global minimum tax proposal 
of the G-20 and inclusive framework does not 
require most participating countries to adopt the 
IIR and UTPR, China would probably not be an 
initial adopter. In the meantime, because China 
has not purported to be the arbiter of what 
international tax policy principles are acceptable, 
it presumably would not have the power to stop 
adoption by a small group of other countries, 
either. Thus, whether it is able to support a 
multilateral agreement would depend mainly on 
what stake it has in the pillar 1 blueprint.
If, on the other hand, the global minimum tax 
proposal requires most countries to commit to 
adopting specific new practices — such that it 
must be made acceptable to countries such as 
Ireland and Singapore — then China will 
presumably work to ensure that the resulting 
international agreement at least does no more 
damage to Hong Kong (and other aspiring trade 
and financial hubs in China) than it does to the 
likes of Ireland and Singapore. Further, it would 
make sure that its obligations under any 
mandatory IIR would be no more burdensome 
than the obligations on other advanced 
economies.
Are there decisive considerations for China 
under pillar 1? The answer again appears to be no. 
China does not have any DST to withdraw. Nor 
does it rely on taxation of its multinationals’ 
foreign profits such that whether those profits are 
allocated to other countries for taxation would 
make a significant difference. Regarding whether 
China might gain revenue by virtue of pillar 1 
allocation to itself, it seems unlikely that the 
revenue would really matter to China so much 
that it would be determinative in the country’s 
position in international negotiations.
In conclusion, it seems the G-7’s global 
minimum tax proposal offers China plenty of 
opportunities to act as a good multilateralist 
(President Xi’s favorite role).41 That is because if 
obligations are created under any new 
international tax agreement, multilateralism can 
serve as a way to weaken those obligations so as 
to minimize harms to China’s competitive 
position as a rising center for global finance.
On the other hand, if few obligations are 
created under the new international tax 
agreement, China also has nothing to lose through 
participating. In those ways, one can even say that 
China’s interests in the upcoming international 
negotiations are aligned with the OECD’s. 
Whether they are with the United States’ is a 
different question. 
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